Ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things' by Charles Sanders Peirce [1898], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things' by Peirce,Charles Sanders (ed/tr Ketner,K.L.) [Harvard 1992,0-674-74967-7]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
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19250
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Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
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19228
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Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
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19241
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An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
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19227
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Philosophy is a search for real truth
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
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19218
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Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
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19229
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Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
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19219
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Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
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19231
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Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
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19247
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The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
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19246
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'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
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19237
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Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
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19256
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Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
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19238
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The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
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19226
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We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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19240
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Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning
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19239
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There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
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19252
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Objective chance is the property of a distribution
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
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19232
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In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
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19223
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We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
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19253
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We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
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19224
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Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
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19243
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If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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19225
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I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
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19234
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'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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19235
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How does induction get started?
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19236
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Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions
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19251
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The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
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19222
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Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
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19220
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We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
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19255
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Generalisation is the great law of mind
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19242
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Generalization is the true end of life
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
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19249
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'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
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19257
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Whatever is First must be sentient
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
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19248
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Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
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19221
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Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
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19233
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Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
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19230
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People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power
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25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
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19245
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We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
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19244
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Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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19254
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Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution
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